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Massimo.Rostagno@ecb.int1. Introduction and Summary
The interaction between monetary policy and asset price volatility has been a matter of
increased concern since the collapse of stock market booms in 2000 and 2007. Are booms like
these suboptimal? Is monetary policy partially responsible for stock market booms? Should
monetary policy actively seek to stabilize stock market booms? These classic questions have
been put back on the table by the experience of the past two decades.
1.1. The conventional wisdom
There is, we believe, a conventional wisdom on the answers to these questions. Booms arise
for reasons largely unrelated to the conduct of monetary policy. Some booms are indeed
excessive. But, it is unwise to identify which booms are excessive and to actively resist them
using interest rate policy. The conventional wisdom is that, in any case, a strategy of raising
the policy interest rate when the in￿ ation forecast is high and reducing it when the in￿ ation
forecast is low should help to dampen excessive volatility. The notion is that booms which
are excessive involve a rise in stock prices above levels justi￿ed by fundamentals. Such a
boom represents a surge in demand because there is nothing currently on the supply side
of the economy to justify it. In a demand boom, however, one expects in￿ ation to be high.
The policy of in￿ ation forecast targeting using an interest rate rule ￿ leans against the boom￿
at precisely the right time. This conventional wisdom was given an intellectually coherent
foundation in two very in￿ uential papers (Bernanke and Gertler (1999,2001)).
1.2. Data
We explore an alternative perspective on the relationship between monetary policy and
booms. We are motivated to consider this alternative by the historical record of United
States (US) stock market booms as well as by the Japanese stock market boom of the 1980s.
We ￿nd that in￿ ation was relatively low in each of the 18 US stock market boom episodes
that occurred in the past two centuries.1 The Japanese case is particularly striking, with
in￿ ation slowing sharply during the boom from its pre-boom level. The notion that stock
market booms are not periods of high in￿ ation, and that they are if anything periods of low
in￿ ation is not new to this paper. The recent work of Adalid and Detken (2007), Bordo and
Wheelock (2004, 2007) and White (2009) also draws attention to this observation. Here, we
stress the implications for monetary policy. The historical record suggests that, at least at
an informal level, a monetary policy which implements in￿ ation forecast targeting using an
interest rate rule would actually destabilize asset markets. The lower-than-average in￿ ation
of the boom would induce a fall in the interest rate and thus amplify the rise in stock prices
in the boom.
A noticeable feature of stock market booms is that, with the exception of only 2 of the
18 booms in our US data set, credit growth is always stronger during a boom than outside a
boom. On average, credit growth is twice as high in booms than it is in non-boom periods.
Casual reasoning suggests that volatility would be reduced if credit growth were tightened
as booms get underway. In practice, this tightening in response to credit growth would not
1We exclude the Civil War and WWI and II from our dataset.
2be justi￿able based on the in￿ ation outlook alone because booms are not in fact periods of
elevated in￿ ation. The idea that credit growth should be assigned an independent role in
monetary policy has been advocated in several papers. We have advocated this position in
work that we build on here (Christiano, Ilut, Motto and Rostagno (2008)).2
According to the conventional wisdom, it is only the ￿ excessive￿booms that are in￿ ation-
ary. Assuming at least some of the booms considered in this paper are excessive, our results
contradict the conventional wisdom that in￿ ation accelerates during such booms. Indeed,
the results raise the possibility that monetary policy is in part responsible for at least some
booms, by responding to the fall in in￿ ation with interest rate cuts.
1.3. Interpreting the data with a New Keynesian model
Our empirical results raise an important question. How could it be that a stock market
boom based purely on expectations about the future, which is therefore driven purely by
demand, not raise in￿ ation? At ￿rst glance, the apparent ￿nding that in￿ ation is low during
such booms may appear simply odd. Without a coherent framework to make sense out of it,
one is reluctant to make an apparent anomaly the foundation for constructing a monetary
policy strategy. This is why we turn to model simulations.
We show that the standard New Keynesian model provides an intellectual foundation
for the notion that in￿ ation is relatively weak in a boom. This is so, even in a boom
that is only based on optimistic (possibly ill-founded) expectations about the future, and
not on real current developments. Our simulations provide support for the notion that a
monetary policy which focuses heavily on in￿ ation can exacerbate booms. No doubt there
exist improvements to banking supervision and credit market regulations that can moderate
asset price volatility.3 However, it seems ine¢ cient to use supervision and regulation to
remove volatility injected by monetary policy. That source of volatility could instead be
removed by an adjustment to monetary policy.
We begin with the simplest possible New Keynesian model, the one analyzed in Clarida,
Gali and Gertler (1999) and Woodford (2003). Because this model does not have capital in
it, we cannot use it to think about a stock market boom. Still, we can use the model to think
about booms driven only by optimism about the future, why in￿ ation might be low at such a
time, and how an in￿ ation forecast targeting interest rate rule might be destabilizing under
these circumstances.4 This analysis gets at the core of the issue - how in￿ ation could be low
in a demand-driven boom - and creates the basic intuitive foundation for understanding the
later results based on models that do incorporate asset prices.
2See also Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2007). The position is often labelled ￿ the BIS view￿(see,
Eichengreen (2009), White (2009) and the references therein). For an application of the Christiano, Ilut,
Motto and Rostagno (2008) analysis to the Japanese economy, see Christiano and Fujiwara (2006). In related
work, Cecchetti, Genberg, Lipsky and Wadhwani (2000) argue that monetary policy should also react to
movements in the stock market.
3We are sympathetic to the idea (see, for example, Hirtle, Schuermann, and Stiroh (2009)) that a macro-
prudential perspective ought to be brought to bear on the supervision and regulation of ￿nancial ￿rms. See,
for example, Barlevy (2008), Evans (2010) and Geanakoplos (2009).
4In developing the intuition for our model results, we stress the case where the interest rate rule is a
function of expected future in￿ ation. However, we show that the results are robust to the assumption that
the interest rate rule is a function of current, actual in￿ ation.
3We assume that people receive a signal which leads them to expect that a cost-saving
technology will become available in the future. In the model, prices are set as a function
of current marginal costs as well as future marginal costs. The expectation that marginal
costs in the future will be lower dampens the current rise in prices. The in￿ ation forecast
targeting interest rate rule leads the monetary authority to cut the interest rate, stimulating
the demand for goods. Output expands to meet the additional demand, raising current
marginal costs. The expected future reduction in marginal cost exceeds the current rise, so
that prices actually fall during the boom.5
That prices are set in part as a function of future marginal costs is essential to our
analysis. In the model, forward looking price setting re￿ ects the presence of price adjustment
frictions. However, it is easy to think of other reasons why price setters might be forward
looking. For example, ￿rms may be motivated to seek greater market share in order to be in
a better position in the future to pro￿t from anticipated new future technologies. The drive
for greater market share may lead to a pattern of price cutting. This particular strategy
for responding to anticipations of improved technology is one that has, for example, been
stressed by Je⁄ Bezos, the CEO of Amazon.6
1.4. Why an in￿ ation forecast targeting interest rate rule may destabilize a boom
The boom that occurs in the wake of a signal about future technology in our model simulation
is excessive in a social welfare sense. Its magnitude re￿ ects the suboptimality of the in￿ ation
forecast targeting interest rate rule. The monetary policy that maximizes social welfare
responds to the optimistic expectations by raising the real interest rate sharply (we refer to
the socially optimal interest rate as ￿ the natural rate of interest￿ ). The reason for the sharp
rise in the natural rate of interest is simple. The expectation of higher future consumption
opportunities creates the temptation to increase consumption right away. But, such an
increase is ine¢ cient because the basis for it - improved technology - is not yet in place. In a
world where markets operate smoothly the e¢ cient outcome - a delay in the urge to consume -
is automatically brought about by a rise in the real interest rate. In such a world, the natural
and actual rates of interest coincide. In the world of our model, the smooth operation of
markets is hampered by price and wage frictions and the monetary authority￿ s control over
the nominal rate of interest gives it control over the real interest rate. This control can
be used for good or ill: the monetary authority has the power to make the real rate of
interest close to or far from the natural rate of interest. The monetary authority using an
in￿ ation forecast targeting interest rate rule responds to the signal about future productivity
in exactly the wrong way. The monetary authority observes downward pressure on in￿ ation
in the wake of the signal, and responds by reducing the interest rate. The di⁄erence between
the high interest rate that is optimal and the low interest rate that actually occurs represents
a substantial and socially suboptimal monetary stimulus. The boom that occurs in the wake
of a signal of improved future technology is largely a phenomenon of loose monetary policy,
5Barsky and Sims (2010) provide vector autoregression evidence using postwar US data which suggests
that a news shock much like the one considered here drives stock prices and economic activity up, and
in￿ ation down. We view this as support for our news-shock interpretation of a stock market booms.
6For example, according to one biography, ￿...from the beginning, Bezos sought to increase market share
as quickly as possible, at the expense of pro￿ts￿(see http://www.achievement.org/autodoc/page/bez0bio-1).
4in our model.
One way to characterize the problem with the in￿ ation forecast targeting interest rate
rule is that the rule does not assign any weight to the natural rate of interest or to any
variable that is well correlated with it. Traditionally, the absence of the natural rate of
interest from interest rate rules is motivated on two grounds. First, in practice this variable
is hard to measure because it depends on hard-to-determine details about the structure of
the economy. Second, in much of the model analysis that appears in the existing literature,
the natural rate of interest ￿ uctuates relatively little and so approximating it by a constant
does not represent a very severe mistake. Regarding the ￿rst consideration, we argue that
credit growth may be a good proxy for the natural rate.
Consider the second motivation for ignoring the natural rate of interest in an interest
rate rule. Until recently, builders of models have assumed that shocks to the demographic
factors which in￿ uence labor supply, to government spending and to the technology for
producing goods and services occur without advance warning. We con￿rm that the natural
rate of interest ￿ uctuates relatively little in response to shocks that occur without warning.
However, recently there has been increased attention to the possibility that people receive
advance signals about shocks.7 Consider the case of shocks to government spending and to
technology. The major government spending shocks are associated with wars. When that
kind spending jumps - the troops are on the move and the bullets are ￿ ying - it does so
after a lengthy period of increased tensions and political maneuvering. These events prior
to actual increases in war spending represent the early signals about government spending.8
Disturbances in technology work in the same way. Signals that the information technology
revolution would transform virtually everything about how business is done existed decades
ago.9 We show below that the natural rate of interest ￿ uctuates a lot more in response
to a signal about a future shock than it does to a shock that occurs without any advance
warning.10 That is, when we take seriously that many disturbances occur with advance
warning, the assumption of a constant natural rate of interest in an interest rate rule is no
longer tenable.
So, the problem with the in￿ ation forecast interest rate targeting rule is that it reduces
the interest rate in a boom triggered by optimistic expectations, while the e¢ cient monetary
policy would increase the interest rate.11 Paradoxically, we ￿rst develop this ￿nding below
7Recent work has been stimulated by the papers of Beaudry and Portier (2004,2006).
8Valerie Ramey (2009, forthcoming) has done important recent work ￿ eshing out the idea that government
spending shocks are heralded by early signals.
9See Michelle Alexopoulos (2007) for a discussion of how the publishing industry broadcasts signals about
future technology changes.
10The intuition for this ￿nding is simple. The natural rate of interest corresponds roughly to the expected
growth rate of consumption from the present to the future. In New Keynesian models ￿t to the data, one
estimates that shocks are highly persistent. For example, an unexpected jump in technology today creates
the expectation of a roughly equal jump in technology in the future. The absence of substantial internal
persistence in models then implies a similar pattern for consumption. This means that the expected growth
rate of consumption - and, hence, the natural rate - is relatively insensitive to the shocks incorporated in
standard econometric analyses. But note how very di⁄erent a shock to expectations about the future is.
Nothing happens in the present. Something only happens in the future. Such a shock has the potential to
have a big impact on the intertemporal slope of consumption.
11Here, we are implicitly assuming that price frictions play a more important role than wage frictions. If
there were only wage frictions, then optimal monetary policy would simply not reduce the interest rate. We
5in a model with only price frictions, in which the optimal monetary policy (i.e., the policy
that sets the interest rate equal to the natural rate) completely stabilizes in￿ ation. That
is, our analysis does not necessarily challenge the wisdom of in￿ ation targeting per se, only
the e⁄ectiveness of doing so with an in￿ ation forecast interest rate targeting rule that is
principally driven by the in￿ ation forecast.12
1.5. Why adding credit growth to the interest rate rule may help
Up to this point, the analysis has focused on models that are su¢ ciently simple that they can
be analyzed with pen and paper. We then verify the robustness of the analysis by redoing
it in a medium-sized New Keynesian DSGE model that incorporates capital and various
frictions necessary for it to ￿t business cycle data well. In this model, optimism about
the future triggers a fall in in￿ ation and a rise in output, the stock market, consumption,
investment and employment. The boom is primarily an artifact of the empirically estimated
interest rate policy rule, in which the forecast of in￿ ation is assigned an important role.
Under the optimal monetary policy the boom would involve only a modest rise in output
and this would be accomplished by a sharp rise in the rate of interest.
We use the medium-sized model to investigate the possibility, suggested by the historical
data record, that assigning a role - beyond its role in forecasting in￿ ation - to credit growth
may help to stabilize booms. First, however, we must modify the model to incorporate an
economically interesting role for credit. We do so by introducing ￿nancial frictions along
the lines suggested in the celebrated contribution by Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999)
(BGG). We obtain the same results in this model that we found in our simple model and in
the model with capital. The in￿ ation forecast interest rate targeting rule causes the economy
to over-react to the optimism about the future, though in￿ ation during the boom is low. The
natural rate of interest rises sharply in the model. When we assign a separate role for credit
growth in the interest rate rule, then the response of the economy is more nearly optimal.
We interpret this as signifying that credit growth is a reasonable proxy for the natural rate
of interest.
1.6. Organization of the Paper
The paper is organized as follows. The ￿rst section below describes the data. The following
section describes the analysis of our simple model. Our analysis features a baseline parame-
terization, but also examines the robustness of the argument to perturbations. We consider,
for example, interest rate rules which look at in￿ ation forecasts as well as at current in-
￿ ation. We also consider the case where price stickiness arises because of frictions in the
setting of wages rather than because of frictions in price setting per se. This is an important
perturbation to consider because empirical analyses typically ￿nd that it is crucial to include
wage stickiness if one is to ￿t the data well. The next section considers the analysis of the
elaborate on these observations in the following subsection.
12Again, we implicitly assume that the key frictions are price frictions. The case for price stabilization
weakens if there are signi￿cant wage frictions. With only wage frictions, it is desirable to stabilize wages,
not prices (Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000)).
6expanded model with credit and asset markets. We o⁄er concluding remarks at the end.
Technical details are relegated to an appendix.
2. In￿ ation and Credit Growth in Stock Market Booms: The Evi-
dence
This section displays data on stock market boom-bust episodes. We ￿nd that in all cases,
in￿ ation is relatively low during the boom phase in these episodes. Real credit growth was
relatively high in all but two episodes. We also examine data on the Japanese stock market
boom in the 1980s. As in all US stock market booms, this Japanese boom is associated
with a drop in in￿ ation. Presumably, the boom was fueled in part by the accommodative
Japanese monetary policy of the time, which cut short term interest rates substantially.
We show that if the Bank of Japan had followed a standard interest rate rule that assigns
weight to in￿ ation and also the output gap, then its interest rate would have been cut even
more sharply. The Japanese experience of the 1980s presents perhaps the most compelling
empirical case for the proposition that an interest rate rule which focuses on the forecast of
in￿ ation exacerbates stock market volatility.13
We split our US dataset into two parts. The ￿rst part covers twelve episodes in the 19th
and early 20th centuries and the second considers four episodes beginning with the Great
Depression. We divide out dataset in this way because we have annual observations for
the ￿rst part and quarterly observations for the second part. In addition, data availability
considerations requires that our concepts of credit di⁄er slightly between the two periods.
Consider the ￿rst part of our data, which are displayed in Figure 1. The stock market
index is the log of Schwert￿ s (1990) index of common stock, after de￿ ating by the consumer
price index.14 The real output measure is the logarithm of real Gross National Product.15
Our measure of real credit is the quantity of bank loans, scaled by the consumer price
index.16 We de￿ne a stock market boom-bust episode as follows. We start with twelve
13This is a theme also developed by Shirakawa (2010), Governor of the Bank of Japan.
14Schwert (1990)￿ s annual index of common stock prices is available for the period 1802-1999 as series
Cj797 in the Millenium Online Edition of Historical Statistics of the United States. The consumer price
index is series Cc1 in the same source.
15These are series Ca9 in Historical Statistics of the United States, Millennial Edition Online. We also
considered the annual industrial production index constructed in Davis (2004), which spans the period 1790
to 1915. Using this variable instead of GDP has very little impact on the results. The mean logarithmic
growth rate of industrial production in the non-boom, non-civil war part of the period 1802-1914 is 4.0
percent. The corresponding mean growth rate in each of our 9 stock market boom periods is 1:2; 7:2; 6:8;
5:3; 11:8; 4:3; 8:5; 4:9 and ￿0:2 percent, respectively. These results are very similar to those reported for
GDP in Table 2.
16Our measure of credit splices together three time series. For the years, 1819-1834 we add series Cj148
(loans and discounts, state banks) and Cj189 (loans and discounts, second bank of the United States) from
Historical Statistics of the United States, Millennial Edition Online. For the period 1834 to 1896 we use
￿ total loans of all banks￿ , series X582 in Chapter X (￿ Banking￿ ), page 1019 of Bicentennial Edition: Historical
Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970, part 2 (HSUS) . For the period 1896 to 1914, we
use series X582 in the table on page 1020 in HSUS. Though the latter two series have the same name, the
coverage of the ￿rst series is incomplete, by comparison with that of the second series (see page 1011 of
HSUS for details). To explain how we spliced the data, let xt denote the ￿rst data series, yt the second and
zt the third. Let t = t1 and t = t2 denote the (unique) date when the ￿rst two and the second two series
7￿nancial panics in the 19th century and the pre-World War I portion of the 20th century.17
These are indicated by a solid circle in Figure 1 and they are listed in Table 3. Although each
panic is associated with a drop in the stock market, Figure 1 indicates that in all but three
cases the stock market had already begun to drop before. We de￿ne the peak associated
with a particular ￿nancial panic as the year before the panic when the stock market reached
a local maximum. We de￿ne the trough before the peak as the year when the stock market
reached a local minimum. The period bracketed by the trough and the peak associated with
a ￿nancial panic is indicated in Figure 1 by a shaded area. In addition, we block from our
analysis the period of the civil war, which is indicated by its own shaded area.
We can see from Figure 1 that in virtually every stock market boom, the price level
actually declined. Moreover, in no case did the price level rise more than its average in the
non-boom, non-civil war periods. In addition, we see that stock market booms are typical
periods of accelerated credit growth. Table 1 quanti￿es the ￿ndings in Figure 1. According
to that table, consumer price (CPI) in￿ ation averaged -2.5 per cent during stock market
booms, substantially less than the 0.7 percent in￿ ation that occurred on average over non-
boom periods. In addition, credit grew twice as fast, on average, during a stock market
boom as during other periods. Table 1 shows just how volatile the stock market was over
this period. It grew at a 10 percent pace during boom periods and shrank at a 6.3 rate in
non-booms. Table 2 provides a breakdown of the data across individual boom periods. The
table documents the fact, evident in Figure 1, that there is little variation in the general
pattern. In￿ ation is lower in every stock market boom than its average value outside of
booms. In the case of credit, there is only one episode in which credit growth was slower in
a stock market boom than its average outside of booms. That is the boom associated with
the 1884 panic.
We now turn to the data for the post World War I period.18 The data are displayed in
overlap, respectively. We let a = yt1=xt1 and set ~ xt = axt: We let b = zt2=yt2 and set ^ xt = b~ xt; ^ yt = byt:
Our data series is then, (^ xt; ^ yt;zt): Our measure of credit di⁄ers from the one used in Bordo and Wheelock
(2004) (see http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/04/11/0411dwd.xls). First, in constructing
yt; they compute the sum of series X582 (i.e, the only series we use) plus series X583 (￿ total investments of
all banks￿ ). We did not include series X583 because, according to page 1011 in HSUS, X583 is composed
primarily of Government debt, while we seek a measure of non￿nancial business borrowing. In any case, our
results are not sensitive to the inclusion of X583. We also di⁄er from Bordo and Wheelock in that we use
data from before 1834.
17We identi￿ed these as follows. Using Google in Windows Internet Explorer (32 bit or 64 bit versions), we
typed ￿ panic of 18￿and Google completed the phrase with 10 panics. To select the episodes in the pre-World
War I portion of the 20th century, we performed the same Windows Explorer exercise. We used all the
panics identi￿ed in this way except the panic of 1901 which was too small to show up as a drop in the stock
market in our annual data set.
18Our data on the CPI and the real value of the S&P composite price index were taken from Robert
Shiller￿ s web page. Data on pre-world war II US real, quarterly seasonally adjusted GNP were taken from
the online data appendix to Bordo and Wheelock (2004). The latter data were spliced with analogous GNP
data for the post world war II period taken from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis￿online data base. For
the period after 1946, we measured credit with the ￿ ow of funds data, ￿credit market instruments￿ , taken
from Haver Analytics (mnemonic, AL14TCR5). For the period, 1946-1951, these data are stocks pertaining
to the fourth quarter of each year. We used log-linear interpolation to estimate observations for the ￿rst,
second and third quarters in the period, 1946-1951. For the period before 1945 are credit market data are
observations on corporate debt, which corresponds to variable cj876, taken from Historical Statistics of the
United States Millennial Edition Online. The pre-1945 data were log-linearly interpolated and spliced with
8Figure 2. We exclude the World War II period from our analysis, and this period is indicated
by the shaded area. The other shaded areas indicate six stock market booms in the 20th and
early 21st century. As in the earlier data set, each boom episode is a time of non-accelerating
in￿ ation. In several cases, in￿ ation actually slowed noticeably from the earlier period. Note
too, that stock market booms are a time of a noticeable increase in the growth rate of credit.
These results in Figure 2 are quanti￿ed in tables 3 and 4. According to Table 3, CPI in￿ ation
in stock market booms is half its value in other (non-World War II) times. Credit growth,
as in the 19th century, is twice as rapid in boom times as in other times. According to the
results in Table 4, in￿ ation in each of the six boom episodes considered is below its average
in non-boom times. With one exception, credit growth is at least twice as fast in booms
as in other periods. The exception was the boom that peaked in 1937. This started in the
trough of the Great Depression.
Figure 3 displays a real index of Japanese stock prices, as well as the Japanese CPI.19
The trough and peak of the 1980s boom corresponds to 1982Q3 and 1989Q4, respectively.
The time of the boom is highlighted in both Figures 3 and 4. What is notable about Figure
3 is that CPI in￿ ation is signi￿cantly positive before the start of the 1980s stock market
boom, and it then slows signi￿cantly as the boom proceeds. In￿ ation even falls below zero
a few times in the second half of the 1980s. We ask what a monetary authority that follows
a standard in￿ ation targeting interest rate rule would have done in the 1980s. In particular,
we posit the following policy rule for setting Japanese call money rate, Rt:
Rt = 0:7Rt￿1 + (1 ￿ 0:7)[R + 1:5(￿t ￿ ￿) + 0:5gapt]; (2.1)
where t denotes quarters, gapt denotes the output gap and ￿t denotes the actual, year-over-
year rate of in￿ ation. For R and ￿ we used the sample average of the call money rate and
the in￿ ation rate in the period immediately preceding the boom, 1979Q1-1982Q3. Also,
we used the gap estimates produced by the International Monetary Fund in the process of
preparing the ￿ World Economic Outlook￿ .20 The results are displayed in Figure 4.21 The
starred line displays the actual call money rate, while the solid line displays the values of
Rt that solve (2.1) over the period 1979Q1-1989Q4. Note that the Bank of Japan loosened
policy very signi￿cantly during the boom, bringing the interest rate down on the order of
300 basis points. That action by the Bank of Japan is thought by many to have been a
mistake, and to have contributed to a stock market boom that in retrospect appears to
have de￿nitely been ￿ excessive￿(see, e.g., Shirakawa (2010)). But, note that if the Bank of
Japan had implemented the policy rule, (2.1), they would have reduced the interest rate an
additional 200 basis points over what they actually did do. One has to suppose that this
would only have further destabilized an already volatile market. We hasten to add a caveat
the post 1945 data. The credit data were converted into real terms by dividing by the CPI.
19Both series were obtained from the IMF￿ s International Financial Statistics data set. The share prices
correspond to series code 15862...ZF... and the CPI corresponds to series code 15864...ZF.... : The real share
prices displayed in Figure 3 have been converted to real terms by dividing by the CPI.
20The call money rate was obtained from International Financial Sta-
tistics. The International Monetary Fund￿ s gap data were found at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2010/01/weodata/weoselser.aspx?c=158&t=1.
21The results are qualitatively similar for a range of values of the coe¢ cients on in￿ ation and the gap, and
the smoothing parameter.
9because we are conjecturing what would have happened under the counterfactual monetary
policy rule, (2.1). Such a counterfactual experiment would have a host of general equilibrium
consequences that might have changed the realized data in profound ways. This is why we
now leave the informal analysis of data and turn to the analysis of models next.
3. A Simple Model For Interpreting the Evidence
We begin our analysis in a model that is simple enough that the core results can be obtained
analytically, without the distraction of all the frictions required to ￿t aggregate data well.
The model is a version of the workhorse model used in Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999)
(CGG) and Woodford (2003).
We posit that the driving disturbance is a ￿ news shock￿ , a disturbance to information
about next period￿ s innovation in technology.22 News that technology will improve in the
future creates the expectation that future in￿ ation will be low and this leads an in￿ ation
forecast targeting monetary authority to reduce the nominal rate of interest. This policy
creates an immediate expansion in the economy. Although the expansion is associated with
higher current marginal cost, in￿ ation nevertheless drops in response to the lower future
expected marginal costs.
We obtain our results in this section under two speci￿cations for why there are frictions
in prices. In one scenario (￿ pure sticky prices￿ ), there are frictions directly in the setting of
prices. In this scenario, wages are set ￿ exibly in a competitive labor market. In the second
scenario (￿ pure sticky wages￿ ), prices are set ￿ exibly, but are in￿ uenced by frictions in the
setting of wages. Our model of wage frictions is the one proposed in Erceg, Henderson and
Levin (2000) (EHL). The ine¢ cient boom with low in￿ ation occurs in both scenarios, though
it does so across a wider range of parameter values under sticky wages.
The action of the monetary authority in reducing the nominal rate of interest in response
to a news shock is exactly the wrong one in this model. Under the e¢ cient monetary policy,
the nominal rate of interest should not be decreased. Indeed, under pure sticky prices the
nominal rate of interest should be increased substantially in response to a news shock. In the
model, it is e¢ cient for employment to be constant in each period, and for consumption to
track the current realization of technology. The news shock triggers an expectation of higher
future consumption, and the e¢ cient rate of interest rises in order to o⁄set the intertemporal
substitution e⁄ects associated with an expectation of higher future consumption.














where Ct denotes consumption and Lt denotes employment. The household budget constraint
is:
PtCt + Bt+1 ￿ WtLt + Rt￿1Bt + Tt;
22The empirical model of the next section includes news about periods further into the future than just
one period. We work with one-period-ahead news in this section because our objective is to keep things
su¢ ciently simple that the basic ideas are apparent.
10where Tt denotes lump sum income from pro￿ts and government transfers, Rt denotes the
nominal rate of interest and Pt;Wt denote the price level and wage rate, respectively.
Final goods, Yt; are produced as a linear homogeneous function of Yit; i 2 (0;1) using









A representative, competitive ￿nal good producer buys the ith intermediate input at price,
Pit: The ith input is produced by a monopolist, with production function
Yit = exp(at)Lit:
Here, Lit denotes labor employed by the ith intermediate good producer. The ith producer is
committed to sell whatever demand there is from the ￿nal good producers at the producer￿ s
price, Pit: The producer receives a tax subsidy on wages in the amount, (1 ￿ ￿)Wt; where
￿ is set to extinguish the monopoly distortion in steady state. The subsidy is ￿nanced by
lump sum taxes on households.
In the pure sticky price version of the model, wages are set ￿ exibly in competitive markets
and prices are set by the intermediate good monopolists, subject to Calvo-style frictions. In
particular, with probability ￿p the ith producer, i 2 (0;1); must keep its price unchanged
to its value in the previous period and with the complementary probability the producer
can set its price optimally. In the pure sticky wage version of the model, intermediate good
producers set prices ￿ exibly, as a ￿xed markup over marginal cost. Following EHL, we adopt
a slight change in the speci￿cation of household utility in which households are monopolists
in the supply di⁄erentiated labor services indexed by j; j 2 (0;1); and they set wages subject
to Calvo-style frictions. With probability ￿w the wage of the jth type of specialized labor
service cannot be changed from its value in the previous period. With the complementary
probability the wage rate of the jth specialized labor service is set optimally.
We consider these two extreme speci￿cations of price/wage setting frictions, because
their simplicity allows us to derive results analytically. We consider the case with both
sticky wages and prices, as well as other features useful for ￿tting aggregate data well, in the
next section.
In our baseline analysis, we adopt the following law of motion for at:





Here, ut represents the white noise one-step-ahead error in forecasting at based on its own










t￿1at￿s = 0; s > 0:
The subscript on ￿
j
t indicates the date when this variable is revealed to agents in the model,






t represents the last piece
of information received by agents about ut and ￿
1
t represents the ￿rst piece of information
about ut+1. We refer to ￿
1
t as ￿ news￿ .
11As is now standard, we express the household￿ s log-linearized intertemporal Euler equa-
tion in deviation from what it is in the ￿rst-best equilibrium - in which the in￿ ation rate is
always zero and the interest rate is R￿
t - as follows:
^ xt = ￿Et
h




+ Et^ xt+1: (3.2)
Here, ^ xt denotes the output gap, the percent deviation between the actual and e¢ cient levels
of output. Also, ^ Rt and ^ ￿t denote the percent deviation of the gross nominal interest rate
and of the gross in￿ ation rate, respectively, from their values in steady state. Similarly, R￿
t
denotes the percent deviation of the gross nominal interest rate in the e¢ cient equilibrium
from its steady state.
As noted above, employment is constant in the e¢ cient equilibrium and consumption is
proportional to exp(at): In addition, in￿ ation is zero. These properties, together with the
assumption of unit intertemporal elasticity of substitution imply that, after linearization, R￿
t
corresponds to the expected change in at :23
R
￿
t = Etat+1 ￿ at = (￿ ￿ 1)at + ￿
1
t: (3.3)
The shock to current productivity, ￿
0
t; enters via at with a coe¢ cient of ￿ ￿ 1: In standard
empirical applications which do not incorporate news shocks, the values of autoregressive
coe¢ cients like ￿ are estimated to be large (in a neighborhood of 0.9), and as a result R￿
t
is not very volatile. At the same time, note how the signal shock, ￿
1
t; appears with a unit
coe¢ cient in R￿
t: Evidently, the introduction of news shocks may increase the volatility of R￿
t
by an order of magnitude. The intuition is simple. A persistent shock that arrives without
advance warning creates little incentive for intertemporal substitution. Such a shock creates
only a small need to change the interest rate. By contrast, a signal that a persistent shock
will occur in the future creates a strong intertemporal substitution motive which requires a
correspondingly strong interest rate response.
The simplest representation of an interest rate rule that focuses on in￿ ation is the fol-
lowing:
^ Rt = a￿Et^ ￿t+1: (3.4)
This speci￿cation of the monetary policy rule, together with a particular labor market sub-
sidy explained in Appendix A are structured so that the steady state of the e¢ cient and
actual equilibria coincide.
Completing the model requires an additional equation, a Phillips curve. We discuss the
Phillips curve corresponding to pure sticky prices and pure sticky wages, respectively, in
the following two sections. The derivation of the equilibrium conditions is tedious, but well
known. For completeness, we include them in the appendix.
23It can be shown that the ￿ e¢ cient￿equilibrium is the Ramsey optimal equilibrium, in the case that there
is no initial price dispersion.The Ramsey equilibrium considers just the private sector optimality and market
clearing conditions, and leaves out a speci￿cation of the monetary poicy rule. In addition, there is a subsidy
on the employment of labor, designed to address the distortions associated with monopoly power. The
endogenous variables, including the tax subsidy are now underdetermined, as there are two more variables
than equations. The Ramsey optimal equilibrium is the con￿guration of variables that satis￿es the private
sector equilibrium conditions and maximizes social welfare.
123.1. Pure Sticky Prices
The equilibrium condition associated with price-setting is, after linearization:
^ ￿t = ￿^ xt + ￿Et^ ￿t+1: (3.5)









(1 + ￿L); (3.6)
where ￿p is the probability that a ￿rm cannot change its price. Also, 1 + ￿L represents the
elasticity of ￿rm marginal cost with respect to the output gap.
The price Phillips curve, (3.5), and IS relation, (3.2), after substituting out for ^ Rt and
R￿
t; represent two equations in two unknowns, ^ ￿t and ^ xt. We posit the following solution,
^ ￿t = ￿￿at + ￿￿￿
1
t (3.7)
^ xt = ￿xat + ￿x￿
1
t; (3.8)
where ￿￿; ￿￿; ￿x; ￿x are undetermined coe¢ cients. The appendix uses straightforward,














(1 ￿ ￿￿)(1 ￿ ￿) + (a￿ ￿ 1)￿￿
> 0:
It is evident that:
Proposition 3.1. ￿x;￿￿ < 0 for all admissible parameter values.
Simple substitution implies the following solution for the interest rate:
^ Rt = a￿  (￿ ￿ 1)￿at + a￿  (￿ ￿ 1)￿
1
t; (3.9)
It is interesting to compare the actual interest rate response, ^ Rt in (3.9), with the e¢ -
cient interest rate response, R￿
t in (3.3). We can see that if a￿ is su¢ ciently large, then
a￿  (￿ ￿ 1)￿ ! ￿ ￿ 1 and the interest rate response to at (and, hence, to ￿
0
t) is e¢ cient.
For more moderate values of a￿ the interest rate at least has the right sign response to at;
though the magnitude of that response is ine¢ ciently weak: By contrast, the response of Rt
to ￿
1
t is perverse. As noted above, the e¢ cient interest rate displays a strong and positive
response to ￿
1
t; while Rt remains unchanged for ￿ = 1 and actually declines for ￿ < 1. To
understand the perverse response of the interest rate to a news shock, we need to ￿rst discuss
the reduced form parameters, ￿x;￿￿;￿￿;￿x:
Consider ￿x; ￿￿: Proposition 3.1 implies that ￿
0
t drives both the output gap and in￿ ation
down. The intuition for this result is straightforward. Given the assumed time series repre-
sentation for at; a positive shock to ￿
0
t raises at and creates the expectation that at will be
13smaller in later periods. Relative to the e¢ cient intertemporal consumption path in which
ct = at; households wish to reallocate consumption into the future. The monetary policy
rule o⁄sets the relative weakness in period t demand by reducing the interest rate, Rt; but
the response is not strong enough. As a result, period t spending expands by less than the
rise in at; accounting for the fall in the output gap in period t. The fall in the output gap
implies weak labor demand and, hence, low labor costs. The reduction in costs accounts for
the drop in in￿ ation.
The fact, ￿￿ < 0; explains why Rt drops in response to ￿
1
t. The news shock creates
the expectation that technology will be launched on a temporary high in the next period,
creating the expectation that in￿ ation in the next period will be low. This is evident by
evaluating (3.7) in t + 1 and taking the period t conditional expectation:







Because a positive disturbance to ￿
1
t reduces anticipated in￿ ation, and because our assumed
monetary policy rule reacts to the in￿ ation forecast, it follows that Rt drops in response to
a positive innovation in ￿
1
t:
The remaining reduced form parameters, ￿￿ and ￿x, control the response of in￿ ation and
the output gap to a news shock, ￿
1
t. Appendix A establishes that these parameters are given
by:
￿x =   (a￿ ￿ 1); ￿￿ =   [￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿) + (a￿ ￿ 1)￿]: (3.10)
From the ￿rst expression, we see that ￿x > 0; so that the output gap always jumps with a
positive signal about future productivity, ￿
1
t. The consumption smoothing motive and the
rise in expected future consumption create a desire to increase current spending. In the
e¢ cient equilibrium the interest rate, R￿
t; increases sharply in order to keep spending equal
to the unchanged current value of at. But, as discussed earlier, Rt either does not respond
at all in the limiting case, ￿ = 1; or it actually falls.
Turning to ￿￿; the impact of ￿
1
t on ^ ￿t operates by way of its e⁄ects on current and future
marginal cost. These e⁄ects can best be seen by solving the Phillips curve forward and
making use of (3.8) and the law of motion for at
24:
^ ￿t = ￿
￿
^ xt + ￿Et^ xt+1 + ￿
2Et^ xt+2 + ￿














The ￿rst term involving ￿
1
t, ￿￿x; pertains to the impact of a news shock on date t marginal
cost. This term is de￿nitely positive because a positive period t news shock raises the period
t output gap (recall, ￿x > 0). Thus, the impact of the news shock on ^ ￿t is positive if we only
take into account period t marginal cost (i.e., if ￿ = 0). Note that the second term involving
￿
1
t is de￿nitely negative (recall, ￿￿ < 0). This term re￿ ects that a positive realization of
￿
1
t signals a fall in future marginal costs. Thus, the net e⁄ect on current in￿ ation of ￿
1
t is
ambiguous and so we must turn to a numerical example.
24The law of motion for at implies
Etat+j = ￿jat + ￿j￿1￿
1
t:
14The intuition sketched in this section suggests that the sign of the period t in￿ ation
and output response to ￿
1
t is likely to be sensitive to the assumptions about the time series
representation of at: Suppose, for example, that at+1 > at after a positive shock to ￿
0
t: In this
case, the shock to ￿
0
t is likely to trigger a surge in the demand for goods, making ￿x and ￿￿
positive.25 This in turn suggests that in the period of a jump in ￿
1
t; ￿rms would anticipate
a rise in marginal cost not only in the current period but in future periods as well, so that
￿t would increase. We explore the robustness of our results to the assumptions about at in
the numerical experiments below.
3.2. Pure Sticky Wages
We now consider the case in which prices are ￿ exible, but there are frictions in the setting
of wages, as spelled out in EHL. They derive the following equilibrium condition:
^ ￿w;t =








(1 + ￿L) ^ xt ￿ b ￿ wt
￿
+ ￿^ ￿w;t+1; (3.12)
where ￿w;t denotes the gross growth rate of the nominal wage rate and ￿ wt denotes the real
wage, divided by technology, exp(at). As before, a hat over a variable indicates percent
deviation from steady state. For completeness, (3.12) is derived in the appendix. The
intuition for (3.12) is straightforward. The ￿rst object in the square brackets is the real
marginal cost of work scaled by the technology shock, expressed in percent deviation from
steady state.26 It is perhaps not surprising that when this object is higher than the scaled
real wage, nominal wage growth is high. The growth rate of the scaled real wage, ￿ wt; the
price level, the nominal wage rate and the state of technology are related by the following
identity:
b ￿ wt = b ￿ wt￿1 + ^ ￿w;t ￿ ^ ￿t ￿ (at ￿ at￿1) (3.13)
With ￿ exible prices, (3.5) drops from the system. In addition, the fact that price setters set
prices as a ￿xed markup over marginal cost implies b ￿ wt = 0 for all t: Imposing this condition
and rearranging, we ￿nd, using (3.3):
Et^ ￿w;t+1 = Et^ ￿t+1 + R
￿
t: (3.14)
Rewriting (3.12) taking b ￿ wt = 0 into account, we obtain:
^ ￿w;t = ￿w^ xt + ￿^ ￿w;t+1; (3.15)
25For an extensive discussion of the relationship between the time series representation of at and the
sign of the contemporaneous in￿ ation and output response to ￿
0
t; see Christiano, Trabandt and Walentin
(forthcoming).
26Let ct denote consumption, scaled by exp(at) and let Ht denote hours worked. The appendix shows
that ^ ct = ^ Ht = ^ xt: Then,
(1 + ￿L) ^ xt = ^ ct + ￿L ^ Ht;
which is the log-linear expansion of the (scaled) marginal rate of substitution between consumption and
leisure when utility is logarithmic in consumption, and constant elasticity in labor.
15where
￿w =






￿ (1 + ￿L): (3.16)
We see an important distinction here between sticky wages and sticky prices. For a given
degree of stickiness in wages and prices, i.e., ￿p = ￿w; slope of the wage Phillips curve, (3.15),
is smaller than the slope of the price Phillips curve, (3.5). The intuition for this is simple.
Because of constant returns to scale, ￿rms in this economy have constant marginal costs.
The marginal cost of supplying labor, by contrast, is increasing in labor and is steeper for
larger ￿L: The price set by a monopolist with a steep marginal cost curve reacts less to a
cost shock than does the price set by a monopolist with ￿ at marginal cost. This e⁄ect on
the monopolist￿ s price response is magni￿ed when demand is highly elastic and explains the
presence of the elasticity of demand for labor in (3.16), ￿w=(￿w ￿ 1):2728
Using (3.14) to replace price in￿ ation with wage in￿ ation in the policy rule and the IS
equation (see (3.4) and (3.2)),
^ Rt = a￿Et [^ ￿w;t+1 ￿ R
￿
t] (3.17)
^ xt = ￿Et
￿
^ Rt ￿ ^ ￿w;t+1
￿
+ Et^ xt+1: (3.18)
The three equilibrium conditions associated with the pure sticky wage model are the wage
Phillips curve, (3.15), the policy rule, (3.17), and the IS equation, (3.18). This system can
be solved for ^ xt; ^ ￿w;t; and ^ Rt: The implications for price in￿ ation can then be deduced using
(3.13) and b ￿ wt = 0:
The solution of the system can be represented as follows:













as in (3.10), with
^ ￿t = ^ ￿w;t ￿ (at ￿ at￿1); (3.20)
according to (3.13). By this last expression, the impact of ￿
1
t on ^ ￿t is simply ￿
w
￿:











￿a￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿)




(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿):
Evidently, the analog of proposition 3.1 holds for sticky wages:
Proposition 3.2. ￿w
￿; ￿w
x < 0 for all admissible parameter values.
27These results can be veri￿ed by considering the usual static monopoly diagram with price on the vertical
axis and quantity on the horizontal, depicting demand, marginal revenue and marginal cost. Then, examine
the e⁄ects of a given upward shift in marginal cost under two scenarios: one in which the marginal cost
curve is ￿ at and another in which the marginal cost curve is steep.
28The impact of increasing marginal costs on the slope of the price Phillips curve has received a lot of
attention in the literature on ￿rm-speci￿c capital. To our knowledge, the e⁄ect was ￿rst noted in Sbordonne
(2002), and also discussed in Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum and Linde (2005), and de Walque, Smets, and
Wouters, (2005).
16In addition, the appendix establishes:
￿
w
x = a￿ (a￿ ￿ 1) w; ￿
w




(1 ￿ ￿￿)(1 ￿ ￿) + (a￿ ￿ 1)￿w￿
:
According to (3.21), the sign of ￿
w
x is de￿nitely negative. To see why, consider a scenario
in which the period t state of technology, at; is ￿xed and a signal arrives that at+1 will
jump. That this can be expected to create expected de￿ ation can be seen by considering
the extreme case in which the nominal wage rate is literally ￿xed. In this case, constancy
of ￿ wt and ￿ wt+1 requires that an x-percent increase in technology be accompanied by an
x-percent decrease in the contemporaneous price level. This implies that the current price
level remains ￿xed after a one percent shock to ￿
1
t, while the period t+1 price level falls by
one percent, i:e:; ￿t+1 < 0: This anticipated de￿ ation, under a price in￿ ation targeting rule
with a￿ > 1; is met in a fall in Rt su¢ ciently large so that the real interest rate also falls.
This expansionary monetary reaction raises the period t output gap by stimulating period
t spending. The wealth e⁄ect associated with the anticipated future rise in technology also
helps to drive up spending.
By (3.20), the impact on period t price in￿ ation, ￿t; of a signal, ￿
1
t; about future tech-
nology corresponds to ￿
w
￿: As in the case of sticky prices, the sign of ￿
w
￿ is ambiguous (see
(3.21)). Present considerations alone (i.e., ￿ = 0) make it positive. This is because the
monetary expansion described in the previous paragraph increases the current marginal cost
of working and this places upward pressure on ￿w;t according to the wage Phillips curve
(3.15). Considerations of the future alone make ￿
w
￿ negative. Intuitively, wage in￿ ation in
the next period, ￿w;t+1; can be expected to fall with the anticipated jump in at+1 because of
the negative sign of ￿w
￿ (see Proposition 3.2). The nature of the Calvo-style wage frictions
suggest that ￿w;t should fall in anticipation of the fall in ￿w;t+1 (see (3.15)). To determine
the sign of ￿
w
￿ for interesting values of the parameters requires numerical simulation.
Departing momentarily from our main theme, we note that in the pure sticky wage
model, a monetary policy that relates the nominal rate of interest to price in￿ ation does not
optimize social welfare. As emphasized by EHL, the e¢ cient allocations can be supported
by a rule which replaces price in￿ ation in the interest rate targeting rule with wage in￿ ation.
To see this, note that in this case the equilibrium conditions formed by the wage-targeting
interest rate rule, (3.15) and (3.18) do not include the natural rate of interest. As a result
the variables, ^ xt; ^ Rt and ^ ￿w;t; determined by those equations evolve independently of the
technology shock. In particular, the ￿rst best outcomes,
^ xt = ^ ￿w;t = 0;
and ^ Rt = 0 satisfy the equilibrium conditions with wage targeting. According to (3.20),
the rate of price in￿ ation, ^ ￿t; is the negative of technology growth under a wage targeting
monetary policy. Because the nominal wage rate is constant under this monetary policy,
while the real wage must ￿ uctuate with technology, it follows that optimal policy does not
stabilize the high frequency movements in in￿ ation in the pure sticky wage case.
173.3. Numerical Results
In this section, we report numerical simulations of the period t impact on in￿ ation and
output of a signal, ￿
1
t; that technology will expand by one percent in the next period. To
investigate robustness of the analysis, we embed the time series representation of at in (3.1)
in the following more general representation:




t￿1; j￿j;j￿j ￿ 1: (3.22)
The representation in (3.1) corresponds to (3.22) with ￿ = 0: When ￿ + ￿ > 1; then (3.22)
implies at follows a ￿ hum-shape￿pattern after an innovation to at: As indicated in our dis-
cussion of sticky prices, with ￿ su¢ ciently large the model is expected to predict a rise in
in￿ ation in the wake of a positive signal, ￿
1
t: Numerical results are reported in Table 5, and
the value of ￿ is indicated in the ￿rst column. Results for the forward looking rule, (3.4), are
reported in Panel A of the table. As a further check on robustness, we also report results for
the case where the interest rate responds to the contemporaneous rate of in￿ ation, rather
than to its expected value in the next period. Results for this case are presented in Panel B.
We adopt the following baseline parameterization of the model:
￿ = 1:03
￿1=4; a￿ = 1:50; ￿w = ￿p = 0:75; ￿1 = 0:9; ￿2 = 0; ￿L = 1; ￿w = 1:20:
In the pure sticky price version of the model, ￿w = 0 and ￿p = 0:75; while in the pure sticky
wage version, ￿w = 0:75 and ￿p = 0:
Consider ￿rst the results for sticky prices in Panel A. Note that in the case stressed in the
text, ￿ = 0; in￿ ation falls 2.8 basis points in the period that ￿
1
t jumps by 0:01; or 1 percent.
At the same time, employment jumps by nearly one percent and the nominal rate of interest
falls by 29 basis points. Under the e¢ cient monetary policy, the interest rate jumps a full
100 basis points, employment does not change and in￿ ation remains at zero. Evidently, the
interest rate targeting rule that feeds back on expected in￿ ation produces very ine¢ cient
results. It creates a boom where there should be none, and it does not stabilize in￿ ation.
Note that as ￿ increases, the interest rate targeting rule becomes more ine¢ cient. For
the largest value of ￿ considered, employment increases 2.5 percent in the period of the
signal shock. However, the cases ceases to be relevant from an empirical standpoint because
in￿ ation now increases in response to the signal shock.
Motivated by the fact that equilibrium models which do well empirically also incorporate
sticky wages, we now consider the sticky wage case in Table 5. Note that with sticky wages,
in￿ ation is predicted to fall and output rise, for all the values of ￿ reported. Thus while the
model with sticky prices is not robust to a hump-shape representation of at; one which also
incorporates sticky wages can be expected to predict more robustly that in￿ ation falls and
the output gap rises, in response to a signal shock.
Now consider Panel B, which reports results for the contemporaneous speci￿cation of the
interest rate rule. The results for ￿t; ht; Rt are qualitatively similar to the results in Panel
A. Figure 5 reports the period t impact on the output gap (￿x) and in￿ ation (￿￿) of a one
percent news shock under perturbations to our baseline model parameterization. In each
case, we ￿x ￿ = 0 and use the policy rule in (3.22). In addition, the parameter perturbations
reported change only the value of the parameter indicated and hold the other parameters
18at their baseline value. As in Table 5, the sticky wage model is more robust in predicting
￿￿ < 0: For example, if the price stickiness parameter, ￿p; falls substantially below the
benchmark value, then ￿￿ > 0: However, ￿￿ < 0 for all values of ￿w reported. Similarly, if a￿
is substantially above its value in the benchmark parameterization, then ￿￿ > 0 with pure
sticky prices, but ￿￿ < 0 with pure sticky wages. Finally, ￿x > 0 for all parameterizations
considered.
In summary, our benchmark sticky price model predicts that in￿ ation drops and employ-
ment rises, in the period that a signal about a future technology expansion arrives. This
resembles the pattern observed for stock market booms. When we depart substantially from
the benchmark parameterization the model predicts a rise in in￿ ation after a news shock.
However, a model with pure sticky wages predicts much more robustly that in￿ ation drops
and the output gap rises in response to a signal shock. We conclude that models with sticky
wages and sticky prices are likely to robustly predict that in￿ ation falls and output rises in
response to a signal shock. Models which simultaneously incorporate both sticky wages and
sticky prices have a state variable and are not so easy to solve analytically as the case of pure
sticky wages and pure sticky prices considered here. We turn to the model that incorporates
both sticky wages and prices in the next section.
4. Analysis in a Medium-Sized Model
In this section, we consider a medium sized New Keynesian model ￿t to US postwar data
by Bayesian methods.29 Relative to the material in the previous section, the analysis here
has the disadvantage that it cannot be done analytically. On the other hand, the results
may perhaps be taken more seriously because they are produced in a model which generates
time series data that more closely resemble actual US data. In addition, in this model
we are able to consider the impact of optimistic expectations about the future on the stock
market (however, the model shares the shortcoming of most models in that it understates the
magnitude of volatility in the stock market). The stock market is a variable that is missing
in the analysis of the previous section. Finally, by adding the ￿nancial frictions proposed
in BGG to our estimated model, we are able to consider interesting modi￿cations to the
in￿ ation forecast targeting interest rate rule. We ￿nd that when we allow credit growth to
play an independent role in that rule, one that goes beyond its role in forecasting in￿ ation,
then the interest rate targeting rule￿ s tendency to produce excessive volatility in response
to optimistic expectations about the future is reduced. We interpret this as evidence that
credit growth is correlated with the natural rate of interest. The natural rate of interest is
what one really wants in the interest rate targeting rule, and credit growth appears to be a
good proxy, at least relative to shocks to expectations about the future.
4.1. A Medium Sized Model
The estimated model incorporates Calvo-style sticky prices and wages, habit persistence in
preferences, variable capital utilization, adjustment costs in the change in investment. We do
29The model is a version of the one in Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) and Smets and Wouters
(2007).
19not display the shocks that were used in the estimation of the model. This section presents
simulations of the model analogous to the simulations performed in the previous section. Our
presentation of the model is limited to what is relevant for those simulations. As in EHL,
we suppose that households supply a di⁄erentiated labor service, lt;j; j 2 (0;1): Preferences














; ￿ = 1:03
￿1=4;
where Ct denotes consumption: The household is a monopoly supplier of its type of labor
service and sets the wage rate, Wjt; subject to the demand for lt;j and to the following
friction. With probability, ￿w = 0:80 the household cannot reoptimize its wage and with the
complementary probability it can set the wage optimally. In case it cannot reoptimize its
wage, Wjt is set as follows:
Wjt = ￿ ￿￿zWjt￿1;
where ￿z = 1:0038 is the steady state growth rate of the underlying shock to technology and
￿ ￿ = 1:006 is the steady state rate of in￿ ation. The household accumulates capital subject
to the following technology:






where ￿ Kt is the beginning of period t physical stock of capital, and It is period t investment.
The function S is convex, with S (￿z) = S0 (￿z) = 0 and S00 (￿z) = 2:2: The physical stock of
capital is owned by the household and it rents capital services, Kt; to a competitive capital
market:
Kt = ut ￿ Kt;
where ut denotes the capital utilization rate. Increased utilization requires increased main-
tenance costs in terms of investment goods according to the following function
a(ut) ￿ Kt;
where a is increasing and convex, a(1) = a0 (1) = 0; a00 (1) = 0:02 and ut is unity in
nonstochastic steady state.
The households￿specialized labor inputs are aggregated into a homogeneous labor service








; ￿w = 1:05:









; ￿f = 1:20:








; zt = exp(￿zt); ￿ = 0:4;
where Kl;t; Ll;t denote the capital and labor services used by the lth monopolist. Also,
at = log(At) and has law of motion analogous to the one in (3.1):









t￿8 are iid shocks which are uncorrelated with each other at all leads and lags,
and with at￿j; j > 0: The shock, ￿
i
t￿i; is observed by agents at date t￿i: We refer to ￿
8
t￿8 as
a ￿ signals￿about at that arrives 8 quarters in advance.
The monopoly supplier of the intermediate good can reset its price optimally with prob-
ability 1 ￿ ￿p; ￿p = 0:77 and with probability ￿p it follows the following simple rule:
Pl;t = ￿ ￿Pl;t￿1:











+ (1 ￿ ~ ￿) ￿ Rt; (4.1)
where Rt denotes the gross nominal rate of interest and













where a￿ = 2:25; ay = 0:32: Here, yt denotes gross domestic product (scaled by zt) and y
denotes the corresponding steady state value. Also, ~ ￿ = 0:57:
4.2. Simulation
Figure 6 presents the results of simulating a particular stock market boom-bust episode. In
the ￿rst period a signal, ￿
8
t > 0; arrives which creates the expectation that at two years later





in fact nothing real ever happens. The dynamics of the economy are completely driven by an
optimistic expectation about future productivity, an expectation that is never realized. This
experiment has a variety of interpretations. One is that people receive actual evidence that
things will improve in the future, evidence that ultimately turns out to be false. Another is
that they are irrationally optimistic about the future and they realize their error when the
thing they expected does not happen.
In interpreting the results it is important to recognize that whether or not the signal is
realized is irrelevant for the analysis in the periods before the anticipated event is supposed
to occur. This is true whether we consider optimal policy, or policy that sets the interest rate
according to a particular rule. This is because neither actual policy nor the policy maker
implementing the optimal policy makes use of any information beyond what private agents
know.
21We simulate the dynamic response of the economy under two circumstances. The thin
line in Figure 6 corresponds to the response of the baseline model, the one de￿ned in the
previous subsection. The starred line corresponds to the response in the Ramsey-e¢ cient
equilibrium corresponding to the baseline model. To obtain the Ramsey equilibrium, we
drop the monetary policy rule. The system is now undetermined, there being many con-
stellations of stochastic processes that satisfy the remaining equilibrium conditions. The
Ramsey equilibrium is the stochastic process for all the variables that optimizes a social
welfare criterion constructed by integrating the utility of each type j household, j 2 (0;1):
The Ramsey equilibrium roughly corresponds to the equilibrium associated with the real
business cycle model obtained by shutting down the wage and price setting frictions and by
imposing that all intermediate good ￿rms produce at the same level and each type j worker
works the same amount. We say ￿ roughly￿here because deleting only one equation (i.e., the
interest rate rule) does not provide enough degrees of freedom for the Ramsey equilibrium to
literally extinguish all the frictions in the model. The Ramsey equilibrium forms a natural
benchmark because it corresponds to the equilibrium with optimal monetary policy.
Note how the rise in investment, consumption, output and hours worked in the baseline
equilibrium exceeds the corresponding rise in Ramsey equilibrium by a very substantial
amount. This excess entirely re￿ ects the suboptimality of the monetary policy rule, (4.1).
Interestingly, the in￿ ation rate in the boom is below its steady state value of roughly 2.5
percent annually, as in the examples of the previous section and as in the data. At the end
of the boom, in￿ ation rises a bit. According to the evidence in Adalid and Detken (2007)
this is what typically happens in boom-bust episodes: in￿ ation is low in the boom phase
and then rises a little at the end.
The 3,1 panel in the ￿gure displays the response of the price of capital in terms of
consumption goods in the model. We interpret this as the price of equity in the model.
Note that in the baseline model, the price of capital rises during the boom. In the Ramsey
equilibrium, the price of capital actually falls. One way to understand this fall in the price of
capital is that the real interest rate in the Ramsey equilibrium (the ￿ natural rate of interest￿ ,
in the language of the previous section) rises sharply with the signal shock. The increased
discounting of future payments to capital explains the fall in the price of capital.30 Monetary
policy in the baseline equilibrium prevents the sharp rise in the interest rate. This is the
heart of the problem with the monetary policy rule. The interest rate should be raised, as
in the Ramsey equilibrium, but there is nothing in the monetary policy rule that produces
this outcome. The most important variable in the interest rate targeting rule, in￿ ation,
actually drives the interest rate in the wrong direction. In e⁄ect, monetary policy is overly
expansionary in the boom. This is what makes the stock market boom (actually, its is not
a very strong boom) and what makes indicators of aggregate activity boom too. As Figure
30There is a second equilibrium condition that the price of capital must satisfy, in addition to the present
discounted value relation. The second condition is the requirement that in competitive markets the price of
capital must equal its marginal cost (i.e., the ￿ Tobin￿ s q￿relation). The signal shock creates the expectation
that technology will be high in the future, and that investment will be strong in response. Given the
adjustment cost speci￿cation, there is a gain to having increased investment in advance. This gain manifests
itself in the form of a reduction in the current marginal cost of producing capital. Given our assumption
that capital is traded in competitive markets, the reduction in cost is passed on in the form of a reduction
in price.
226 indicates, only a small part of the boom re￿ ects the operation of optimistic expectations.
The boom is primarily a phenomenon of loose monetary policy. Again, it bears repeating
that the nature of the boom is independent of whether the signal is ultimately realized or
not.
Interestingly, an outside observer might be tempted to interpret the rise in labor produc-
tivity during the boom as indicating that an actual improvement in technology is underway.
In fact, the rise in productivity re￿ ects a sharp rise in capital utilization. This phenomenon
would be even greater if the model also incorporated variations in labor utilization.
In sum, an interest rate targeting rule that assigns substantial weight to in￿ ation trans-
forms what should be a modest expansion into a signi￿cant boom. The reason is that the
monetary policy does not raise the interest rate sharply with the rise in the natural rate of
interest. This problem can be ￿xed by setting the interest rate to the natural rate or, if
that is deemed too di¢ cult to measure, to some variable that is correlated with the natural
rate. We explored the latter option. We added the ￿nancial frictions sketched by BGG to
the baseline model, in order to obtain a model in which credit growth plays an important
economic role. We found that when we simulate the resulting model￿ s response to a signal
shock, the equilibrium more closely approximates the corresponding Ramsey equilibrium if
credit growth is introduced into the interest rate targeting rule, (4.1). In particular, we
replace ￿ Rt in (4.2) with:








+ ￿c ￿ nominal credit growtht; ￿c = 2:5;
where credit is the quantity of loans obtained in the BGG model by entrepreneurs for the
purpose of ￿nancing the purchase of capital. We ￿nd that in the baseline model, with
￿c = 0; households would pay 0.23 percent of consumption forever to switch to the Ramsey
equilibrium. We also ￿nd that households would pay 0.19 percent of consumption forever
to switch to the equilibrium in which ￿c = 2:5: We interpret this as evidence that including
credit growth in the interest rate rule moves the economy a long way in the direction of the
Ramsey equilibrium, in which monetary policy sets the interest rate to the natural rate of
interest. These calculations have been done relative to signal shocks. A full evaluation of the
policy of including credit in the interest rate targeting rule would evaluate the performance
of this change when other shocks are present as well.
5. Conclusion
We have reviewed evidence which suggests that in￿ ation is typically low in stock market
booms and credit growth is high. The observation that in￿ ation is low suggests that an
interest rate targeting rule which focuses heavily on anticipated in￿ ation may destabilize
asset markets and perhaps the broader economy as well. The observation that credit growth
is high in booms suggests that if credit growth is added to interest rate targeting rules, the
resulting modi￿ed rule would moderate volatility in the real economy and in asset prices.
These inferences based on examination of the historical data constitute conjectures about
the operating characteristics of counterfactual policies. To fully evaluate conjectures like
23these requires constructing and simulating a model economy. This is why we devoted sub-
stantial space model analysis. The model simulations reported in the paper lend support to
our conjectures.
24A. Appendix: Deriving the Equilibrium Conditions for the Simple
Model
We present a formal derivation of the simple model in section 3. Although the results are
available elsewhere, we report them here for completeness. We suppose that the law of
motion for log technology, at; has the following representation:



















Households participate in spot competitive labor markets, where the wage rate, Wt; is set
￿ exibly. In addition, in period t households have access to a bond market in which the
gross nominal rate of interest from t to t+1 is denoted Rt: In addition, households purchase
consumption goods, Ct; at price, Pt: The household budget constraint is:
PtCt + Bt+1 ￿ WtLt + Rt￿1Bt + Tt;
where Tt denotes lump sum income from pro￿ts and government transfers. The ￿rst order


























The representative, competitive ￿nal good producer buys the ith intermediate input at price,
Pit: The ith input is produced by a monopolist, with production function
Yit = exp(at)Lit:
Here, Lit denotes labor employed by the ith intermediate good producer. The ith producer is
committed to sell whatever demand there is from the ￿nal good producers at the producer￿ s
price, Pit: The producer receives a tax subsidy on wages in the amount, (1 ￿ ￿)Wt: The
subsidy is ￿nanced by lump sum taxes on households. The ith intermediate good producer
sets Pi;t subject to Calvo frictions. Thus, in any period 1 ￿ ￿p randomly selected producers
may reset their price, and the remainder must set price according to:
Pi;t =
￿
Pi;t￿1 with probability ￿p
~ Pt with probability 1 ￿ ￿p
The resource constraint is:
Ct ￿ Yt:
We now describe the equations that characterize the private sector.
25A.1.1. Private Sector Equilibrium
We obtain a set of equations which characterize a private sector equilibrium. We then
describe a log-linearization of those equations about steady state. It is easy to verify that
each of the intermediate good producers which has an opportunity to set price in period t,








Here, ~ Pt denotes the price set by an optimizing intermediate good producer. Also,
Kt = ￿fst + ￿￿pEt￿
"
t+1Kt+1
Ft = 1 + ￿￿pEt￿
"￿1
t+1Ft+1






Here, st denotes the (after subsidy, ￿) marginal cost of production, where the real wage has
been replaced by the household￿ s marginal rate of substitution between consumption and
leisure (we impose a unit Frisch elasticity of labor supply).
Combining the ￿nal good production function with the ￿rst order condition of interme-










Evaluating this integral taking into account the price set by current-period optimizers and






























































The resource constraint implies Ct = Yt:


























































Here, we have used the aggregate resource relation to substitute out for consumption. We
assume that the labor market subsidy is set to eliminate the monopoly ine¢ ciency in the
labor market. That is,
￿f (1 ￿ ￿) = 1:
Thus, there are 5 equilibrium conditions in 6 variables, Lt; Rt; p￿
t; Ft; Kt; ￿t:
For a given value of steady state in￿ ation, ￿; we use the steady state version of the above
equations to solve for the steady state values of the other variables. In steady state, the 5


















































































Finally, K is computed using one of the two equations above in K:
Let ^ zt denote dzt=z; for a small deviation, dzt = zt ￿ z: Totally di⁄erentiating the 5





t + ^ Lt
￿
= ^ Rt ￿ ^ ￿t+1 ￿ ^ p
￿

































^ ￿t+1 + ^ Ft+1
￿












^ ￿t+1 + ^ Kt+1
￿
(3) ^ Kt =
￿p
1 ￿ ￿p
^ ￿t + ^ Ft
Substitute out for ^ Kt from (3) into (2), and then (1) into the result, to obtain:
^ ￿t = ￿^ st + ￿^ ￿t+1 (A.2)











where ^ st denotes the percent deviation of real marginal cost from its steady state. Note that
when ￿ = 1; then the law of motion for the price distortion simpli￿es to ^ p￿
t = ￿p^ p￿
t￿1: This
implies that, as long as the system has been operating for some time, we can simply set
^ p￿
t = 0 for all t: In this case, the linearized intertemporal equation can be written
￿^ Lt = ^ Rt ￿ ^ ￿t+1 ￿ ^ Lt+1 ￿ (at+1 ￿ at);
where we have dropped the ￿ d￿in front of the at￿ s because the steady state cancels.
We take the e¢ cient equilibrium to be the ￿rst-best, in which in￿ ation is zero, Lt = 1
and Ct = At: It can be shown this is the Ramsey e¢ cient equilibrium when the labor
subsidy is chosen to eliminate the distortions of monopoly power in the steady state and
price distortions are zero in the initial period.
28A.1.2. Interest Rate Rule Equilibrium







where the implicit target for in￿ ation is its e¢ cient level of zero. Substituting these as-
sumptions in to the monetary policy rule and linearizing the latter about steady state, we
obtain:
^ Rt = a￿Et^ ￿t+1:
Equilibrium output is yt = exp(at)p￿
tLt: In a zero in￿ ation steady state L = 1 and we
may, to a ￿rst approximation, p￿








^ xt = ^ Lt;
where ^ xt is the percent deviation of actual output from Ramsey output. With these modi￿-
cations, the intertemporal Euler equation can be written
^ xt = ￿
h





Here, xt is the output gap.
We now explain the formulas for the solution to the simple model in section 3. Sub-
stituting out for Rt and R￿
t in the IS curve from the policy rule and the R￿
t equation, we
obtain:
^ xt = ￿Et
￿





^ ￿t = ￿^ xt + ￿Et^ ￿t+1;
where
￿ ￿ ￿(1 + ￿L):




































Collecting terms in at and ￿
1
t :
￿x = ￿[(a￿ ￿ 1)￿￿￿ ￿ (￿ ￿ 1)] + ￿x￿;
￿x = ￿[(a￿ ￿ 1)￿￿ ￿ 1] + ￿x
￿￿ = ￿￿x + ￿￿￿￿;
￿￿ = ￿￿x + ￿￿￿:
29Using the ￿rst of these equations to simplify the second, we obtain:





￿￿ = ￿￿x + ￿￿￿￿;
￿￿ = ￿￿x + ￿￿￿:





Using the latter to solve the ￿rst:
￿x = ￿
1






Now, consider ￿￿ :


















￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿) + (a￿ ￿ 1)￿
(1 ￿ ￿￿)(1 ￿ ￿) + (a￿ ￿ 1)￿￿
:
A.2. Sticky Wages
In this section, we interpret the labor, Lt; hired by intermediate good ￿rms as supplied by
￿ labor contractors￿ . These contractors supply Lt by combining a range of di⁄erentiated labor









The labor contractors are perfectly competitive. They take the wage rate, Wt; of Lt as given.
They also take the wage rate, Wt;j; of the jth labor type as given. Contractors choose inputs























We now turn to the households. We adopt the ￿ indivisible labor￿ . Accordingly, suppose
there is a large number of identical households. Each household has many members cor-
responding to each type, j; of labor: Each worker of type jth has an index, l; distributed
uniformly over the unit interval, [0;1], which indicates that worker￿ s aversion to work. A
type j worker with index l experiences utility:
log(Ct) ￿ l
￿L; ￿L > 0;
if employed and
log(Ct);
if not employed. The notation re￿ ects that each worker in a household, whether employed
or not and regardless of labor type, enjoys the same amount of consumption. This is the
e¢ cient arrangement, given our assumption that worker utility is separable in consumption
and leisure and the household objective is to maximize the equally-weighted integral of
worker utility.
The quantity of labor supplied by the representative household, ht;j; is determined by
(A.3). We suppose the household sends j￿type workers with 0 ￿ l ￿ ht;j to work and keeps
those with l > ht;j out of the labor force. The equally weighted integral of utility over all
l 2 [0;1] workers is:















It remains to explain how Ct and ht;j are determined.
The wage rate of the jth type of labor, Wt;j; is determined outside the household by a
monopoly union that represents all j-type workers across all households. The union￿ s problem
is discussed below. The household seeks to maximize the expected present discounted value
of utility, (A.5), subject to the following budget constraint:
PtCt + Bt+1 ￿ BtRt￿1 +
Z 1
0
Wt;jht;jdj + Transfers and pro￿tst: (A.6)
The only thing for the household to do is choose Ct and Bt+1: The ￿rst order necessary
condition for optimization implies (A.1).
For each j there is a monopoly union that represents all type j workers across all house-
holds. The union is required to satisfy its demand curve, (A.3). It faces Calvo frictions in
31the setting of Wt;j: With probability 1 ￿ ￿w a union can optimize the wage and with the
complementary probability, ￿w; it cannot, in which case,
Wt;j = Wt￿1;j: (A.7)
With this speci￿cation, the wage of each type j of labor is the same in the steady state. Be-
cause the union problem has no state variable, all unions with the opportunity to reoptimize
in the current period face the same problem. In particular, such a union chooses the current

















Here, ￿t+i denotes the marginal value assigned by each household (recall, they are all iden-
tical) to the wage.31 The household treats ￿t as an exogenous constant. In the above
expression, ￿w appears in the discounting because the union￿ s period t decision only impacts
on future histories in which it cannot reoptimize its wage. Also, ht
t+i denotes the level of
employment in period t + i of a union that had an opportunity to reoptimize the wage in


























￿a;t+1￿a;t+2￿￿￿￿a;t+i￿t+1￿￿￿￿t+i i ￿ 1
1 i = 0
: (A.10)
















































31The object, ￿t; It is the multiplier on the household budget constraint, (A.6), in the Lagrangian repre-










t+i in (A.11) denotes the (scaled) cost of working for the marginal worker in
period t + i whose wage was reoptimized in period t and not again reoptimized in periods















According to (A.11), the union seeks to set the wage to a markup, ￿w; over the cost of
working of the marginal worker, on average.
We now expand (A.11) about a steady state in which
wt = 1; ￿i = 1; all i; ￿ wt = ￿wMRS; ￿t = 1;￿w;t = 1:





^ ￿a;t+1 + ^ ￿a;t+2 + ￿ ￿ ￿ + ^ ￿a;t+i
￿
￿ ^ ￿t+1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ^ ￿t+i i > 0
0 i = 0 ;
\ MRS
t










t+i ￿ ^ Ht+i =
￿ ￿w
1￿￿w (^ wt ￿ ^ ￿w;t+1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿^ ￿w;t+i) i > 0
￿w
1￿￿w ^ wt i = 0
:




















^ ct+i + ￿L ^ Ht+i
i





i ^ ￿w;t+i = ￿￿w^ ￿w;t+1 + ￿￿wSw;t+1: (A.15)



















￿^ ￿a;t+1 ￿ ^ ￿t+1
￿
+ ￿￿wS￿;t+1:
33Because the object in square brackets in (A.11) is zero in steady state, the expansion of
(A.11) does not require expanding the expression outside the square bracket. Taking this





b ￿ wt + ^ wt
￿
+ S￿;t ￿ SMRS;t: (A.17)
We now deduce the restriction across wages implied by (A.4). Using (A.7) and the fact












Divide by Wt and use (A.10):























^ ￿w;t + S￿;t (A.18)

























(^ ￿w;t ￿ ￿￿w^ ￿w;t+1) + (S￿;t ￿ ￿￿wS￿;t+1)






























^ ￿a;t+1 + ^ ￿t+1
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34The relationship between wage and price in￿ ation, the change in the real wage and technology
growth is given by:
b ￿ wt = b ￿ wt￿1 + ^ ￿w;t ￿ ^ ￿t ￿ ^ ￿a;t: (A.20)















b ￿ wt + ^ ￿w;t+1 ￿ b ￿ wt+1
￿













Collecting terms in b ￿ wt; b ￿ wt+1; ^ ￿w;t; ^ ￿w;t+1 :



















































(1 ￿ ￿w)(1 ￿ ￿￿w)
￿￿w
:






^ ￿w;t = ￿w
￿
















^ ct + ￿L ^ Ht ￿ b ￿ wt
￿
+ ￿^ ￿w;t+1: (A.21)
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Figure 6: Response of Baseline and Perturbed Model to Signal Shock (Signal not realized); Perturbation = Ramsey





























s labor productivityTable 1: Variables Over Various Sub-periods, 1803-1914
Periods CPI Credit GDP Stock Price
Boom -2.5 9.5 4.6 10.2
Other 0.7 4.0 3.1 -6.3
Non-civil war -0.7 6.5 3.7 0.8
Notes: (1) numbers represent 100 times average of log ￿rst di⁄erence of indicated vari-
able over indicated period.(2) Boom periods are the union of the trough to peak periods
enumerated in Table xx.(3) Other are periods that are not booms and that fall outside of
1861-1865. (4) results for credit data based on period, 1819-1914, due to data availability
Table 2: Variables in Stock Market Boom Episodes
A. Non-boom, non-civil war, 1803-1914
CPI Credit GDP Stock Price
0.7 4.0 3.1 -6.3
B. Boom episodes
panic trough-peak CPI Credit GDP Stock Price
1819 1814-1818 -8.0 na 1.8 9.8
1825 1822-1824 -9.8 21.9 3.7 12.1
1837 1827-1835 -1.5 14.6 4.9 5.2
1857 1847-1852 -1.3 7.6 5.4 6.9
1873 1865-1872 -4.1 11.9 4.8 8.5
1884 1877-1881 -0.6 3.5 7.5 16.0
1890 1884-1886 -2.2 4.9 5.9 15.2
1893 1890-1892 0.0 5.6 4.5 7.9
1896 1893-1895 -3.3 4.2 4.4 3.9
1903 1896-1902 0.3 8.6 5.3 11.1
1907 1903-1905 0.0 7.6 2.3 18.3
1910 1907-1909 -1.8 4.0 0.6 25.1
Notes: (1) numbers represent 100 times average of log ￿rst di⁄erence of indicated variable
over indicated period. (2) panel A: data averaged over period 1802-1914, skipping 1861-
1865 years and trough to peak years. (3) panel B: data averaged only over the indicated
trough-peak years. (4) Panics occur after stock market peak. (5) na signi￿es ￿ not available￿ ,
observations on credit begin in 1819Table 3: Variables Over Various Sub-periods, 1919Q1-2010Q1
Periods CPI Credit GNP Stock Price
Boom 1.8 5.3 4.6 13.8
Other 4.0 2.3 0.2 -11.7
Whole period 2.7 4.0 2.7 2.7
Notes: (1) numbers represent 100 times average of log ￿rst di⁄erence of indicated variable over in-
dicated period.(2) Boom periods are the union of the trough to peak periods enumerated in Table
xx.(3) ￿ Other￿ are periods that are not booms and that exclude World War II (1939Q4-1945Q4).
￿ Whole period￿ corresponds to the full sample, excluding World War II.
Table 4: Variables in Stock Market Boom Episodes
A. Non-boom, non-World War II, 1919Q1-2010Q1
CPI Credit GNP Stock Price
4.0 2.3 0.2 -11.7
B. Boom episodes
trough-peak CPI Credit GNP Stock Price
1921Q3-1929Q3 -0.2 5.7 5.9 19.3
1932Q2-1937Q2 0.6 -2.1 6.5 24.2
1949Q2-1968Q2 2.0 6.3 4.2 8.1
1982Q3-1987Q3 3.2 7.5 4.3 17.5
1994Q2-2000Q2 2.5 6.1 3.9 16.4
2003Q1-2007Q1 3.0 4.6 3.0 10.1
Notes: (1) numbers represent 100 times average of log ￿rst di⁄erence of indicated variable over indi-
cated period. (2) panel A: data averaged over period 1919Q1-2010Q1, skipping 1939Q4-1945Q4 and
trough to peak years. (3) panel B: data averaged only over the indicated trough-peak years. (4) Panics
occur after stock market peak.
2Table 5: Period t Response to News, ￿
1
t; that Period t + 1 Technology Innovation Will be 1% Higher
In all cases, the natural rate, R￿
t; jumps 100 basis points





Panel A: Policy rule - ^ Rt = a￿Et^ ￿t+1
￿ ￿t ht Rt EtRt=￿t+1
Sticky P Sticky W Sticky P Sticky W Sticky P Sticky W Sticky P Sticky W
0 -2.8 -15 0.98 0.84 -29 -175 -9.8 -58
0.125 -0.42 -16 1.1 0.98 -29 -178 -9.8 -59
0.2 1.7 -18 1.2 1.1 -29 -181 -9.6 -60
0.6 42 -28 2.1 2.3 8.2 -200 2.8 -67
0.8 117 -25 2.5 4.7 111 -206 37 -69
Panel B: Policy rule - ^ Rt = a￿^ ￿t
0 -1.7 -10 0.78 0.93 -2.5 -15 13 97
0.125 -0.25 -11 0.87 1.1 -0.4 -16 15 97
0.2 1.0 -12 0.93 1.2 1.5 -17 16 97
0.6 22 -16 1.4 2.3 33 -24 35 98
0.8 61 -8.7 1.6 4.2 92 -13 58 106
Notes: (1) in￿ation and rates of return, ￿t, Rt, EtRt=￿t+1 expressed in deviations, in units of quarterly basis points, from steady state; (2) hours worked, ht,
is expressed in percent deviation from steady state; (3) for parameter values, see text.
3